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Contribution In this paper we focus on assessing and mitigating the risks related to the availability of the IT in-I. INTRODUCTION frastructure. This is particularly challenging because of the Information Risk Management is the process of assessing (temporal) dependencies linking the various constituents of the risks an organization's IT infrastructure is exposed to, and an IT infrastructure (machines, processes, assets, etc.) with of developing strategies to manage them. The process of Risk each other. In complex information systems, a failure in a Management is usually divided into two main steps: Risk As-remote component may propagate across the infrastructure and sessment (RA) and Risk Mitigation (RM). The former activity eventually affect the availability of a good deal of the entire identifies potential harmful threats to the information systems, system. Failing to appropriately assess the consequences of while the latter consists of developing and implementing a such propagations will result in inaccurate RA and RMs.
strategy to manage them. Nowadays, Risk Management is
We argue that current Risk Management methodologies (e.g. often a primary task in enterprise organizations and it is COBIT, ISO 17799 [18] , ISO 13335 [17] or OCTAVE [26] ) widely considered a key factor for improving an organization's show limitations when evaluating and mitigating availability IT performance. Moreover, recent legislations, such as the risks. This is due to the fact that they do not fully consider Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 or the international accord the consequences of the functional dependencies between the known as Basel II [5] (International Convergence of Capital constituents of an IT infrastructure: the consideration of these Measurement and Capital Standards), explicitly requires this dependencies is mostly left to the judgement of the assessor kind of activity to be conducted to ensure stakeholders that carrying out the RA phase (although this is not made explicit the organization is operating properly.
clearly). Thus, these methodologies can only be useful to Among the three main security properties of information, identify and fix individual risks an organization is exposed to Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA), the impor-(see also Section II). On the other hand, these dependencies tance of availability has grown enormously: today, organiza-are considered in more specific assessment methods such tions strongly depend on the availability of their information as the Business Continuity Plans, like in the new standard systems; moreover, availability of IT-related services is contin-BS25999 [16] (see Section II for a detailed overview). These uously growing in importance for enterprise revenues (on-line methods, however, do not specify how to use this information for RM.
This work has been accomplished during the third author's stay at the Summarizing, nowadays the process of assessing and mitUniversity of Trento, Italy, supported by the Serenity project. The first author..
is supported by the research project PROSECCO. The second author is igating availability related risks depends very much on the supported by the research program Sentinels (www.sentinels.nl). human expertise, making Risk Management more an art than a science. Although COBIT does not provide any practical solution Our thesis is that it is possible to carry out an accurate for mitigating the risks, it requires the organization to imtool-based RM by using the data collected during RA and plement a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) to realize and BCP activities. To substantiate this thesis, in this paper we improve the availability of an information system and its core present a framework and a tool for the assessment and processes. Until recently, no methodology was available to mitigation of availability-related IT risks. The framework is conduct in a precise way this activity although it is of primary based on the Time-Dependency (TD) model, an extension of importance when running a complex information system. The the model of the IT infrastructure as it is done according to new standard for managing business continuity BS25999 [16] the BS25999 (which largely coincides with the data collected is mainly focused on providing guidelines to understand, by the KARISMA tool developed at KPMG for RA, see develop and implement a BCP, and aims to provide a stanSection V). This model allows us to determine how incidents dard methodology. This standard requires the organization to will propagate across the organization, and therefore what is complete different steps when preparing the BCP: (1) identify the actual impact of incidents. With this information, we can the activities/processes which carry the core service used by carry out an optimization study by comparing the true expected the organization, (2) identify the relationships/dependencies benefit determined by the different countermeasures that can among themselves, (3) evaluate the impact of the disruption be put in place to cope with the various risks.
of the core services/processes previously identified (Business As we will mention, the computational complexity of the Impact Analysis, BIA). The most critical activities/processes problems posed by our method, make it impossible to carry out are intended to be the ones whose direct/indirect monetary loss the underlying analysis by hand, and this is why the method is significantly high. we propose requires the presence of an appropriate tool. We
When the risk has been assessed and evaluated, one has to have implemented the tool using UPPAAL CORA [21] and identify the best countermeasures to reduce the risk. Typically, Prolog.
there exists a number of different solutions (technical or We consider our solution a concrete enhancement to RM organisational) from which business and IT managers must methodologies, providing automatic support to better evaluate choose the best one(s) meeting the required security level the IT relationships and dynamics.
given the available budget (or finding the best compromise between the cost of the countermeasures and the benefit they provide). As we mentioned before, current methodologies are There exists a number of standards and methodologies not sufficiently taking into account how business processes are for Risk Management, among which COBIT (Control Ob-linked together and the way a single incident could propagate jectives for Information and related Technology) [11] and and affect the whole organization's information system. The BS25999 [16] are of particular relevance to our work. COBIT fact that COBIT and ISO 17799 do not consider dependencies is the de facto standard for information control and IT Risk between processes has even greater impact in the mitigation Management, addressing IT governance and control practices. phase of availability risks: it is standard practice to protect It provides a reference framework for managers, users and the processes whose availability has a greater direct impact security auditors. COBIT is mostly based on the concept on the organization goals, while a more accurate analysis in of control (be it technical or organizational) which is used many cases reveals that it is more cost effective to protect to assess, monitor and verify the current state of a certain some of the processes that have an indirect impact as well. process (that may refer to procedures, human resources, etc.) involved in the information system. To implement COBIT another entity it depends on becomes unavailable. We express this measure in hours. (2) The cost associated to the downtime represent their relationships. The presence of an edge from of those processes directly affecting the business objective of node a to node b indicates that b depends on a, and that the organization (indirect relationships are taken care of by the if a becomes unavailable for long enough, b will become model). We express this measure in Euro per hour. (3) A list unavailable as well. To model this correctly, we also need of possible incidents affecting the IT infrastructure, together to indicate how long b will be able to survive without the with a conservative estimate of the average downtime each of presence of a. We do that by annotating each edge with them cause (per entity), given the controls already in place. the survival time: the time span the dependent entity can We also need an estimate of their expected frequency. For survive if the other one fails. While for some relationships, the sake of uniformity, in the sequel we express the downtime such as the dependency of an application onto the machine caused by each incident in hours and their estimated frequency it runs on, this amount is obviously set to zero, in case of in times per year. (4) A list of countermeasures. For each dependencies between applications this can vary between zero countermeasure we need an estimate of (a) their deployment and several hours (e.g. in case that an application needs to and maintenance costs (expressed in Euro per year), (b) the be fed by another one with data at regular time intervals). effect is has on the estimated frequency of the incidents and/or Sometimes it is possible to extract this information from on the downtime they cause. the functional requirements documentation or from the SLA In Section V we address the problem of how and when this specification. Although one can argue that these values could data can be collected during the RA and BCP processes.
change over time, we have empirically verified (by inspecting TD model
The basic elements of the model are the documentation of several enterprise organizations) that this is constituents of the IT infrastructure. We follow notable archi-not usually the case: organizations do not require such a level tecture frameworks such as TOGAF [29] , Zachman [30] and of detail yet. ArchiMate [3] as well as IT Governance solutions (IBM [12] Definition 3.1: A TD model is a pair (N, ->) where N is a and ISACA [11] ), to determine those elements which may set of nodes and -*C N x N x T7 . directly or indirectly be involved in an incident: Processes, We write n1 -t n2 as shorthand for (in1, in2, t)e Applications and Information, Technology and Infrastructure A TD model allows one to express e.g. the dependencies or Facilities. Processes describe critical processes necessary of hardware components on the physical environment they are to carry out the business, like manage orders or invoicing, located in, the dependency of an application on the machines Applications and Information are objects related to the soft-it runs on, and the dependency of a business process on the ware necessary to enable business operations e.g. produc-applications supporting it. We will show in Section V that this tion control applications, customer relationship management graph can be built in a fully automatic way.
(CRM) applications or critical databases. Technology refers to systems, networks and industry-specific technology needed to enable applications and data, and Infrastructure or Facilities are physical locations necessary to house service technologies.
Running example -Part 1: We present here an example lh (intentionally oversimplified) of the business/IT infrastructure of a small bank segment with ten entities (see Table I ): Running example -Part 2: Figure 1 shows a TD model three applications supporting business processes while db1 and built with the entities from Table I . The edges connecting n, db2 are two databases accessed by applications. Finally, inl, to inl, m2 and m3 express the dependency of the machines on m2 and m3 are the three machines running applications and the network connection with other machines. The connections in1 is the network segment connecting the three machines. from ml to a1, a2 and a3, from m2 to db1 and from m3 to db2
We represent a TD model using a graph, where nodes express the dependency of software processes (applications represent the basic entities and labelled edges between nodes or databases) on the machines they run on. For all of these connections the survival time is set to zero, since no entity the unavailability time of nl, due to the incident, exceeds the can survive the disruption of the ones it depends on, not even survival time of n2 w.r.t. nl, causing it to become unavailable for a short time. In turn, P1 depends on both a, and a2, since until the incident is resolved. the customer management is achieved by providing on-line Running example -Part 4: Figure 2 shows how i1 propabanking and trading, but with different time constraints (five gates across our organization. hours for a, and only one hour for a2 w.r.t. m3 is zero. After five minutes a2 goes down and a3
Incidents and their propagation Once the model of the follows after fifteen minutes. Accordingly to the TD model, architecture is defined, it is possible to simulate the availability after one hour from the disruption of a2, the process P1 goes of the system during and after the occurrence of an incident. down and after eight hours P2 goes down as well. After il We define incidents as events causing the unavailability of a has been repaired, nine hours after to, all entities are repaired given set of resources for a given time. in turn. For instance, if we expect that the average occurrence of Downtime(i, n): the downtime caused by incident i on node incident i would bring down machine ml for 3 hours, we n (including propagation). This is the crucial information model this by setting i(ml) = 3. needed in the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation phases by Running example -Part 3: Let us now introduce three dif-evaluating the global consequences of an incident, as we will ferent incidents affecting the availability of M3: Table II address in Section IV. presents them. In 4' one of m3's hard disks is broken and the downtime is the average time required to replace the broken disk and restore data. i2 consists of a power disruption in the The system we introduced in Section III allows us to model building hosting M3, in this case the downtime is the average the propagation of incidents. We now show how we can use duration of a power disruption. i3 consists in an OS failure, due this information for selecting the best set of countermeasures; to software bugs, causing the consequent freeze of applications technically we aim at finding the set of countermeasures which running in m3 and the downtime is the average time needed minimizes the cost due to the forecasted downtime of relevant to detect the incident and reboot M3. business processes. means that the occurrence of a incident i1 (which -after We note that in practice most countermeasures fall into one propagation -causes a downtime of 55 minutes on P2) would of two classes: frequency countermeasures and time councreate a damage of 110 Euro. In practice, D may not be linear termeasures, accordingly to the resulting effect. The former (a downtime of 24 hours may well cause more losses that 24 reduce the frequency of a given incident, while the latter downtimes of one hour). In general, D should be provided by reduce the downtime due to the incident. In frequency counthe organization's business department for the most important termeasures, the projection of m on org', I' is the identity business processes and, in general, for all the business-relevant function. It is worth noting that a countermeasure completely entities in the organization. One can argue that providing an preventing an incident can be modelled by setting to zero either accurate D function can be a time expensive task. In our the frequency or the downtime relative to the incident. experience this does not represent a particular problem, as Running example -Part 5: Table III countermeasures while c8 is organizational; moreover cl, C4-Now, the downtime function computed using the TD model c7 are frequency countermeasures since their effect is to together with the damage and the frequency evaluation allows reduce the frequency of certain incidents, while c2, c3 and us to compute the expected cost (per year) due to service c8 are time countermeasures since they reduce the downtime downtime for the whole organization.
of M3. Figure 3 shows the propagation of incident i1 after the application of c8, which reduces the downtime of m3 to -
------------------------------
The goal of Risk Mitigation is to bring down the estimated M3-downtime cost by applying a set of countermeasures, which can be either technical or organizational. To achieve full -IfInningeIties -i-ptedenties generality we define a countermeasure as a function which modiies he oganiatio, th setof icidets a wel as heir Fig. 3 . Propagation chart of incident i1 with countermeasure c8 in place.
frequencies. Each countermeasure has also a cost per year I suulypsil oapymr hnoecutresr (summing the amortization and the maintenance costs).
ontesm niy btfrti ehv to cosie tha on countermeasure may be incompatible with another one. An OS input data required by our tool is readily available after a RA patch, for example, can be incompatible with other patches; and a BCP, and that it is possible to cope with the complexity moreover, deploying a backup machine can be useless if other of the algorithms the tool requires. backup techniques are already in place. information from previous observations (history of attacks): Definition 4.5: Let org be an organization, I be a set of the more accurate these observations are, the more precise the incidents, Freq be the frequency estimate for I, and C be a assessment outcome is. set of countermeasures.
To further substantiate our argument, we note that this data . We call the estimated global cost of incidents is also collected by tools devised to assist the RA and RM question-driven procedure, there is a map of the business Thus, the best set of countermeasures is the one minimizing process entities (together with their relationships) and the the expected global cost. Similarly, the expected benefit of a Business Impact Analysis values. KARISMA is based on given set of countermeasures is the difference between the COBIT, and it is very likely that other tools for RA based on expected downtime cost Esdc(I) and the expected downtime COBIT would collect the same information. Our system can cost after applying the countermeasures: Esdc(I, BC). degepisbiona We also note that most of the information required to tion of countermeasures (cl-c). Recall that only the disru n build the TD model is also available when applying to an of p1 and P2 involve a loss to the organization (see Figure 1) [3] . Indeed, the layers defined strategy to mitigate the risk is to install the OS service pack in those frameworks are similar to the ones we adopt for our and to update m3's disks. model, though used for different purposes (e.g. architectural Summarizing, our model provides IT managers with an support, new component impact evaluation, etc.). Since those effective way of choosing the best set of countermeasures for project are widely employed (ArchiMate for instance is used a given system. For space reasons, we have not addressed by ABN Amro and the Dutch Tax Office), and are supported other optimization possibilities which are made possible by by several tools, they provide us an indirect confirmation of this model, but it is easy to see that one can use it to find for the feasibility of actually obtaining the data needed by our instance "the least expensive set of countermeasures which model. bring the expected downtime of service A down to 10 hours Summarizing, our tool does not require organizations to per year" or "the best set of countermeasures within a given acquire new information (i.e. to employ new resources), rather budget". it uses in a different way the information already available after V.FEASIBILITY RA and BCP.
In this section we argue that the approach we propose is Computational complexity The second concern regarding feasible. In particular, we show that the vast majority of the the feasibility of our approach is whether the algorithms underlying our framework are not too complex to be carried adopt UPPAAL [22] , because (1) it allows to specify a time out in reasonable time. It is easy to see that -even if we dependent system (such as the one we need to model) and (2) assume that the organizational graph is acyclic -evaluating its extension UPPAAL CORA allows to solve optimization the optimal of countermeasures has complexity in the order problems such as those previously required in points (b) and of (e x r x i x c!) where e is the total number of entities, r (d). is the total number of relationships between entities, i is the UPPAAL requires the system to be specified as a timed total number of possible incidents and, finally, c is the total automaton [9] , [6] , which is a finite automaton extended with number of possible countermeasures. The presence of cycles a finite set of real-valued clocks. Clock constraints, i.e. guards could increase the complexity, but we believe that practical sit-on edges, are used to restrict the behaviour of the automaton. uations present graphs that can be rendered acyclic after some UPPAAL CORA, is an extension of UPPAAL for cost optimal preprocessing. The only problematic factor in the equation is reachability analysis which applies the theory of Linearly of c!, which indicates that the presence of a relatively large Priced Timed Automata (LPTA) [21] . LPTA extend the model set of countermeasures would make it infeasible to carry out of timed automata with prices on all edges and locations. In a brute-force analysis to find the best set of countermeasures. these models, the cost of taking an edge is the price associated Presently, we are working at a brute force implementation with it, and the price of a location gives the cost-rate applied which is already giving satisfactory results on real datasets, when delaying in that location. In UPPAAL CORA prices and we have developed heuristics based algorithms finding a are defined by means of an implicit monotonically growing local optimum whose complexity is (e x r x i x c3), which variable called cost. give very satisfactory results (in our experiments, the local UPPAAL has the additional advantage of allowing us to optimum always coincides with the global optimum). Other map in a very natural and straightforward way every element ways to bring down the c! include automatically splitting the of our model into a timed automaton with the same behaviour. set of countermeasures into various set of independent counter-This one-to-one translation ensures the absence of side effects measures, which will make it possible to apply compositional due to the implementation. For the sake of presentation we do methods.
not report here further implementation details.
To test our implementation we use a dataset related to a VI. IMPLEMENTATION real insurance company collected by KPMG auditors using A preliminary problem we had to solve when tackling KARISMA during a RA. The dataset contains all the inforthe implementation issue is that of automatically building mation needed to build the TD model (19 macro business the TD model. The information about the IT and business processes and 122 sub-processes); the remaining information infrastructure is typically spread across a number of free (about incidents, costs and countermeasures) is also provided text documents. To build the model it is necessary to report by the KPMG auditing team who conducted the assessment. information in a structured form, such as database tables. In first instance, to avoid the state explosion problem and Fortunately there exist tools for supporting the RA (such as maintain a reasonable computational time, we perform the KARISMA) which can deliver this information in a structured analysis on portions of the infrastructure, and then merge format. We automatically build the TD model by representing results. In second instance we realize a translation of the each entry in the entity table of the dataset with a node and UPPAAL model into Prolog. This second implementation each entry in the link table with an edge between nodes, allows us to deal with the entire dataset at once, without annotated with the survival time.
splitting the IT infrastructure, and tens of incidents while The actual implementation requires us to realize an al-maintaining the computational time in the order of minutes. gorithm which (a) explores the TD model to simulate the We carry out optimal analysis for partitions of up to 18 consequences of the incidents, VII. RELATED WORK To realize this we use in first instance model checking [9] , There exist various academic frameworks for carrying out which is a technique to algorithmically analyse concurrent RA, but they all differ from our proposal in that they do not systems, typically used for verifying if (a model of) the model the propagation of incidents across an organization as system satisfies some given properties, often specified as a precisely as we do. For instance, Lenstra and Voss [23] present temporal logic formulas. The reason of this choice is that a quantitative approach to IT risk management to determine the model checkers are already devised to quickly explore a graph optimal RM strategy given a limited budget. Their approach of several (thousands of) possible system behavioural traces, requires performing a risk assessment on all the applications to find the one realizing a given property. Therefore, model supporting business processes and identifying the (monetary) checkers provide us with a way of doing fast prototyping loss due to each threat on the business process they support, without sacrificing performance too much. Among the several thus the risk is evaluated in terms of the likelihood and the model checkers available (e.g., SPIN [15] , SMV [24] , etc.) we loss. Authors define an action plan (set of countermeasures) as something influencing the likelihood of a threat thus reducing using model checking to assess the survivability of distributed the risk; furthermore they associate a cost to it. The selection systems [19] , [10] . Jha and Wing [19] use the NuSMV model of the best set of action plans consists in finding the set that checker to model the distributed environment and generate a mostly reduces the likelihood of all threats within a given failure scenario graph (sum of counterexamples of survivabilbudget. Since this approach is designed to deal with threats ity properties) by injecting faults into the model. Secondly, to all the three aspects of information security (CIA), to they add some additional information about the probability of keep it feasible it lacks in a complete representation of the harmful events to perform reliability analysis and cost/benefit constituents of an IT infrastructure (machines, facilities, etc.) analysis of possible countermeasures. Our approach differs in and in modelling the time dependencies between them, which that we model also time dependencies between entities: thus -as we have discussed in the introduction -is essential for we are able to perform a more accurate evaluation of the properly modelling the availability risks. Our model, on the global impact. Furthermore our approach is strictly focused other hand, being specifically tailored for availability risks, on information Risk Management. Cloth and Haverkort [10] takes into consideration the time dependencies and therefore develop a model checking-based approach to evaluate the allows us to simulate how an incident propagates across the survivability of a system. Survivability is defined as the ability organization.
of a system to recover in a timely manner predefined service Furthermore, the authors' choice of allowing a single, levels after the occurrence of a disaster. They describe the atomic, action plan per threat implies that the risk management system as a Stochastic Petri Net and then automatically convert team should already have found manually the best set of it into a Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC). Finally countermeasures to be applied in response to an incident. The they use a model checking engine to obtain a time-probability proposed framework then, simply decides to apply or not this chart that expresses the recovery probability in relation to the set of countermeasures. On the other hand, our model is able recovery time. to compute the best set of countermeasures without requiring any pre-processing phase and allowing one to find a more VIII. DISCUSSION, FUTURE WORK AND LIMITATIONS fine-grained solution.
Asnar and Giorgini [4] introduce an extended Tropos [8] In this paper we focus on the mitigation of risks related goal model to analyse risk at organization level and to iden-to the availability of an organization's IT infrastructure. We tify and enumerate relevant countermeasures for RM. Their argue that the way present methodologies address the time approach is mainly devoted to the enumeration of incidents and functional relationships between the constituents of the and countermeasures, while our approach focuses on selecting IT infrastructure is inadequate to properly evaluate the global and prioritizing incidents to be mitigated and possible counter-consequences of an incident. Our contribution consists of a measures to perform the mitigation. Another proposal is that methodology and a tool for carrying out a Risk Mitigation of Aagedal et al. [1] , who developed the CORAS framework to activity which allows to assess the global impact of a set of produce an improved methodology for precise, unambiguous, risks and to choose the best set of countermeasures to cope and efficient risk analysis of security critical systems. CORAS with them. This is achieved by employing the TD model that focuses on the tight integration of viewpoint-oriented visual allows us to represent the actual propagation of an incident modelling in the RA process, using an UML-based approach in across the organization and to deal with the countermeasures the context of security and RA. Our approach is orthogonal to selection process. To this end, the presence of a tool is CORAS, in the sense that we could use the output of CORAS necessary due to the complexity of the selection process. to feed out tool.
We argue that the input required by our approach is typically
In addition to academic work there exist a number of already available after a serious RA and BCP assessments; commercial tools supporting the Risk Management and RM this makes our proposal attractive as it does not require the process. The most closely related to our work are Counter-collection of new information. Indeed we believe that our ap- Circular A-130 USA standards. It provides the ability to Our approach is aimed at finding the set of countermeasures perform cost/benefit analysis and ROI on countermeasures. minimizing the expected yearly cost due to the unavailability GStool [14] is developed by Federal Office for Information of IT services. Here we note that a related organization goal Security (BSI) to assist users of the IT Baseline Protection is that of achieving a given Recovery Time Objective (RTO), Manual. GStool supports a qualitative assessment of protection i.e. the latest point in time at which operation must resume requirements. The main difference between these approaches after a failure. While this does not reduce the value of our and ours is that they face the countermeasures selection by an proposal, we believe our model for incident propagation can economic prospective (ROI) or a technical prospective only, be extended to analyse the required steps to achieve the given rather we merge the two aspects in an holistic behavioural RTO. This is one of the targets for our future work. model of the whole organization. For a wider list of Risk Actually, our present system could already be used for this Management supporting tools refer to [13] .
purpose by employing a cost function which is zero before the Finally, our work has some analogy with some proposal for RTO and very high after the RTO. However, we must warn
